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Abstract—This paper proposes a novel method for the integra-
tion of channel-based key generation in a real-time digital voice
communication system. For this purpose, a specific hardware
platform was developed. To obtain the keys for the cipher,
channel-based key generation is used to generate identical keys on
both sides of the channel, based on the unique reciprocal channel
characteristics. Hamming code key reconciliation drastically
reduces the probability of remaining key errors, while a cyclic
redundancy check (CRC) is used as a final checking mechanism.
As a proof of concept, the generated key is used to encrypt as well
as decrypt the audio by means of an XOR operation at both sides
of the link. Several measurements were performed, showing that
new keys are continuously being formed and replaced. Additional
measurements also create more insight into the key update rate
and key entropy for different parameter settings in the algorithm.
Index Terms—Digital Voice Communication, IEEE802.15.4,
Channel-Based Key Generation, ADF7242 Transceiver, 2.4 GHz
ISM Band.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), over Low Power Wireless
Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN), ZigBee, Bluetooth and
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) are popular short range network
protocols operating in the license-exempt 2.4 GHz ISM radio
band. 6LoWPAN is the most commonly used standard in
IoT communication protocols, because it is IP-based [1]. IoT
applications consist of highly constrained devices that are
not always suitable for optimal cryptographic algorithms [2].
Therefore, a more lightweight key algorithm such as channel-
based key generation can save processor power and increase
battery life of IoT devices.
Channel-based key generation is based on the fact that
every channel between two random parties can be seen as
a unique communication channel. Because of shadowing,
multipath fading and Doppler spread, the two random parties
have a unique source of information to build an identical
channel-based key. A potential third party, also known as an
eavesdropper, does not have access to this kind of information
and therefore cannot build the same key.
In literature, a practical wearable communication system
implementing channel-based key generation was developed in
[3]. The system was tested in different indoor and outdoor
scenarios with very promising results. However, it was stated
that some kind of key reconciliation is needed to obtain
error free keys in all scenarios. More experimental results
for an encrypted wireless link between two body-worn sensor
nodes are presented in [4]. In [5], an increased accuracy for
reciprocal channel assessment was obtained by using a very
short round-trip delay of 614 µs. Previous results show the
possibility of a very lightweight channel-based key generation
algorithm. Although previous papers prove that equal keys can
be generated, the implementation of such a key generation
algorithm in a real-time digital voice communication system
was not documented yet.
In this paper, specific hardware is designed and realised for
implementing digital voice communication at 2.45 GHz. Next,
a channel-based key generation algorithm is implemented in
software to encrypt the audio samples. The encryption algo-
rithm is developed in such way that the voice communication
is never interrupted. The software for the microcontroller unit
(MCU) is developed in C code.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the development of the hardware platform. In Sec-
tion III the general algorithm for channel-based key generation
as well as the implementation in software is explained. Finally,
a number of measurements are discussed in Section IV.
II. HARDWARE PLATFORM
A more detailed overview of the hardware platform is shown
in Fig. 1. This hardware platform was developed to function
as a standalone system for half-duplex audio communication
and it can be divided into four main components. The first
one (yellow) consists of two parts, the MCU itself and the
serial wire debug (SWD) interface to program it. The RF part
consists of the transceiver and some peripherals, and is shown
in red. Everything that deals with audio playback or audio
recording is shown in blue. Finally, the green part implements
the user interface, consisting of an OLED and a number of
push-buttons.
A. Transceiver
The ADF7242 transceiver is a highly integrated, low
power and high performance transceiver for operation in the
global 2.4 GHz ISM band [6]. The transceiver operates in
IEEE802.15.4 mode with a maximal data rate of 250 kbps and
features two radio frequency input and output (RFIO) channels
from which only one will be used.
The balanced output signal of the half-duplex RFIO
channel is converted to an unbalanced signal through the
2450BM15A0015E balun from Johanson Technology, with a
frequency range from 2400 MHz to 2500 MHz [7]. Next,
the unbalanced output port of the balun is connected to the
LFL182G50TC1B905 band-pass filter from Murata Manu-
facturing and has an impedance of 50 Ω [8]. Finally, the
signal goes to a SMA connector launcher, which has also an
impedance of 50 Ω.
Fig. 1. Detailed block diagram of the standalone hardware platform
B. Audio recording and playback
Audio recording is done with a basic electret microphone
which produces an analogue output signal. This signal is then
amplified by the MAX9814 microphone amplifier from Maxim
Integrated Products [9] and sent to one of the ADC’s of the
MCU.
The audio can be played on the compact internal speaker or
on an external speaker through a 3.5 mm audio jack. Therefore,
the DAC of the MCU is connected to an LM386 audio
amplifier from Texas Instruments [10]. A digital potentiometer,
the AD5160 by Analog Devices [11], is implemented between
the DAC output of the MCU and the audio amplifier to be able
to control the audio volume in software.
C. User interface
The user interface consists of an OLED display driven by
an SSD1306 driver [12] and 5 push-buttons. One of the push-
buttons is also connected to the wake-up pin of the MCU. As a
result, this button can wake up the MCU from standby mode.
Another prerequisite is that one of the push-buttons acts as
a push-to-talk button. The remaining buttons can be used for
different purposes, e.g. volume control or changing parameters
during testing.
D. MCU
The final part of the hardware platform consists of the
STM32F410CBT3 MCU [13] and the SWD interface.
III. CHANNEL-BASED KEY GENERATION
Channel-based key generation uses the characteristics of
the communication channel on which both the transmitter
and the receiver are operating. The characteristics of the
communication channel, such as fading, are highly correlated
between the two legitimate parties. As a result, both parties
can use this unique source of information to generate an equal
key. A potential eavesdropper will not have access to the same
source of information and therefore will not be able to generate
the same key.
The first part of this section will give a high-level overview
of the software. Next, the general operation of the channel-
based key generation algorithm is explained. The last part of
this section explains how this algorithm can be implemented
in the software for the MCU.
A. Software overview
A high-level overview of the software is shown in Fig.
2. The transmitter uses an internal interrupt to convert the
audio samples with the ADC and saves them in a buffer.
Next, the audio samples are encrypted with the channel-based
key and sent to the transceiver. The transmitter also receives
response packages from the transceiver that are necessary for
the encryption algorithm.
The receiver reads the encrypted audio packet and saves
the decrypted audio samples in a buffer. Similarly, an internal
interrupt is used to send the audio samples to the speaker
through the DAC.
Fig. 2. Software overview
B. General algorithm
The ADF7242 automatically measures and saves the Re-
ceived Signal Strength (RSS) in one of its registers for every
received packet. By using these measurements, a real-time
moving average RSS can be obtained for both the transmitter
and the receiver. To avoid computational overhead on the
processor, an exponential moving average is used to update the
mean RSS when a new packet is received. Equation (1) shows
the general formula of this algorithm. µ[n-1] corresponds to
the previous moving average and µ[n] to the new moving
average. RSS[n] is the new incoming value that is added to the
exponential moving average. α is a factor between 0 and 1,
corresponding to the weight of the last added value. α closer
to 1 will lead to a fast changing moving average and α closer
to 0 will lead to a slower and steadier moving average.
µ[n] = αµ[n] + (1 − α)µ[n-1] (1)
New key bits are always chosen by the transmitter. When-
ever the RSS measured by the transceiver drops below a certain
threshold below the average RSS, a logic 0 will be chosen as
a new key bit by the transmitter. Similarly a logic 1 will be
chosen when the new RSS is larger than a certain threshold
above the average RSS. This decision algorithm is the same
as in [4]. When a new key bit was chosen by the transmitter,
the receiver needs to be notified as soon as possible. Then the
receiver can also determine if the latest RSS value was higher
or lower than a certain threshold above or below the average
RSS.
In order to build an equal key on both sides of the
communication link, two checking mechanisms should be
implemented to ensure identical keys are obtained. These
checking mechanisms should not send too much sensitive
data over the communication channel for obvious security
reasons. A first checking and correcting mechanism is the key
reconciliation on small groups of bits, as was also proposed in
[4]. With Hamming correction this can easily be implemented
without too much overhead on the processor. The Hamming
code is always calculated by the transmitter and then sent to
the receiver. The receiver also calculates the Hamming code
and compares this to the one of the transmitter.
Because the mentioned key reconciliation cannot guarantee
that identical keys are obtained, a second checking mechanism
is required. When a new key was built by the transmitter with
a length of e.g. 128 bits, a cyclic redundancy check (CRC)
is used as a final check before applying the new key. When
the CRC of the receiver is identical to the transmitter’s, the
new key can be applied. Note that the actual key contains a
multiple of the amount of information which is transmitted in
the form of Hamming and CRC check bits.
C. Implementation in software
The software for this application was developed in C with
the STM32CubeIDE environment of STMicroelectronics. It
is mainly interrupt driven to use the MCU as efficiently as
possible.
As already mentioned in Section I, a short round-trip
delay can increase accuracy for reciprocal channel assessment
[5]. Because of that, the transceiver at the transmitter’s end
is configured in automatic TX-to-RX turnaround mode and
similarly the transceiver at the receiver’s end is configured in
automatic RX-to-TX turnaround mode.
Key reconciliation with Hamming code is applied to every
new byte, resulting in a Hamming code of 4 bits. These 4 bits
are sent to the receiver to correct one potential wrong bit.
The STM32F410CBT3 MCU features a CRC calculation
unit that can be used to calculate the CRC checksum of the
key in a very efficient way. Whenever a new key is found the
transmitter calculates the CRC32 checksum and adds these 4
bytes to the data packet.
The 128-bit key is currently used to XOR the audio
samples, as a proof of concept for voice encryption. This
paper focuses on generating equal keys during real-time audio
communication without interrupting the audio. In a more
critical application, the generated 128-bit key can be used in
combination with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-128
to achieve a highly secure communication system.
IV. MEASUREMENTS
All measurements were executed with external monopole
antennas with a maximal gain of 4.3 dBi.
A. Spectrum and output power
The behaviour of the ADF7242 transceiver has been verified
with a FSV40 spectrum analyser (SA) from Rohde & Schwarz.
The measurement of the output power in Fig. 3 was done with
the Max Hold functionality of this SA. For this measurement,
the peak level of the power amplifier (PA) was programmed
to its maximum value of +4,8 dBm. The measured output
power at the centre frequency was -14.47 dBm for a resolution
bandwidth of 30 kHz. This value is within the expected
range for IEEE802.15.4 mode, which has a very high peak-
to-average power ratio [6].
Fig. 3. Output power of the ADF7242 transceiver
B. Received signal strength
A number of RSS measurements were done with two de-
vices in a line-of-sight (LOS) and a non-line-of-sight (NLOS)
environment. The goal of these measurements was to deter-
mine the maximal range for the communication channel in
both environments. An overview of the results can be found
in Table I.
TABLE I
RSS FOR DIFFERENT SITUATIONS
Distance [m] Propagation RSS [dBm]
0.1 LOS -22
1 LOS -42
5 LOS -58
10 LOS -61
20 LOS -78
5 NLOS -77
10 NLOS -89
It can be noticed that as soon as there are large objects in
between the two devices (such as walls and doors), the RSS
drops really fast. The sensitivity of the ADF7242 in IEEE
802.15.4 mode is -95 dBm [6]. As can be seen in Table I,
a distance of 10 m in a NLOS situation corresponds to a
RSS of -89 dBm. This means that the distance between the
devices should not exceed this distance in a NLOS situation.
In LOS it was possible to reach distances of 20 m without
communication loss. Adding a +20 dB gain power amplifier
IC, is expected to increase the latter range to about 100 m.
C. Channel correlation between transmitter and receiver
The correlation between the transmitter and the receiver was
measured over a period of 8 s in an indoor LOS environ-
ment. During the measurements the transmitter was moving
the entire time. The RSS samples from both the transmitter
and receiver were saved in the flash memory of the MCU
and analysed in postprocessing. The packet transmission rate
during this test was 400 packets/sec and corresponds to one
packet every 2.5 ms. The correlation between transmitter and
receiver is shown in a scatter plot in Fig. 4. From the results
in Fig. 4, it can be stated that the correlation remains high
over the entire range of RSS values. However, there are also
outliers in this measurement, which appear more prominent at
lower RSS values. The measured RSS for the lowest values is
likely varying more due to noise.
Fig. 4. Correlation between the RSS of the transmitter and the RSS of the
receiver in LOS
Similar measurements were performed in both LOS and
NLOS environments in [3]. In this paper, the correlation
between one of the two legitimate parties and a potential
eavesdropper was also examined in different scenarios. Results
showed that the correlation between one of the two legitimate
users and a potential eavesdropper was significantly lower than
between the two legitimate parties.
D. Moving average RSS vs measured RSS
In Fig. 5 the same RSS samples for the transmitter as in
the previous measurements are compared against the moving
average calculated by the transmitter. The blue line shows the
measured RSS samples and the red line shows the average RSS
that was updated for every new sample, using α = 0.1. This
moving average was calculated with the algorithm explained
in Section III. Based on the results in Fig. 5, some conclusions
can be drawn. The first remark is that the threshold chosen by
the transmitter can have a big impact on the entropy of the
key and the update rate of the key. It can be noticed that the
dips of the measured RSS are deeper than the peaks upwards.
As a result, a big threshold can lead to a key with a lot more
logic zeros than logic ones and hence a very low entropy.
The second remark is that the time between choosing two
key bits can also have a big impact on the entropy of the
key. The packet rate in this measurement was set to 400
packets/sec, which leads to theoretical maximum key update
rate of 400 bits/sec. It can be noticed that if no delay is added
between choosing two key bits, repetitive patterns of logic
zeros or logic ones will lead to a key with a very low entropy.
Fig. 5. Measured RSS and average RSS (with α = 0.1) over a time interval
of 8 s corresponding to 3200 RSS samples in LOS
E. Key update rate
The speed at which the key is replaced, is an important
aspect of this encryption algorithm. The faster the key can be
updated, the securer the communication channel becomes.
Two parameters have a large influence on the key update
rate. The first one is the threshold, chosen by the transmitter.
From the results in Fig. 6, it can be stated that larger thresholds
result in lower key update rates. Secondly, the delay between
choosing two key bits also has an influence on the key update
rate. It is obvious that the longer the transmitter waits after
a key bit is chosen, the longer it will take to generate a new
key.
Based on the results in Fig. 6, one could choose for no delay
and a threshold of 1 dBm to achieve the highest update speed
of around 75 bits/sec. But in the next subsection it will become
clear that a high update rate also has a major drawback.
Fig. 6. Key update rate for different thresholds and delays
F. Key entropy
From the results in Fig. 7, it seems that if no delay is used
between choosing two key bits, the key entropy per bit is not
more than 0.62 bit. This is because the key contains many
repetitive patterns of logic zeros or logic ones. These patterns
can be avoided by adding a delay after the transmitter has
chosen a new key bit.
Fig. 7. Key entropy for different thresholds and delays
High key update speeds have the downside of a very low key
entropy. Therefore, a minimal delay of 10 ms is necessary to
generate good keys. The optimal combination to have a decent
update speed and a high entropy is a delay of 20 ms with a
threshold of 1 dBm. This combination results in an update
speed of around 25 bits/sec and a key entropy of 0.95 bit.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper the development of a hardware platform for
digital voice communication with channel-based encryption
is explained and tested. The goal of this hardware platform
was to implement channel-based encryption in real-time digital
voice communication on 2.45 GHz. The encryption algorithm
was successfully implemented in software without interrupting
voice communication at any time. Audio quality was excellent
in all tested scenarios.
Different combinations between the key threshold and the
delay were tested to achieve an optimal result for both the key
update rate and key entropy. An optimal combination of a key
threshold of 1 dBm and a delay of 20 ms resulted in an update
speed of 25 bits/sec and a key entropy of 0.95 bit.
Based on the results within this paper, the channel-based key
generation algorithm can be used in combination with AES-
128 to achieve a highly secure digital voice communication
channel.
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